![]() ![]() Specifically, it avoids the four defects discussed in this Article. This new jury instruction, presented in Part IV, is rooted both in logic and empirical evidence. However, because my reform effort achieved only limited success, this Article advocates for a more aggressive approach: rewriting the burden of proof jury instruction from scratch. This Article identifies four common jury-instruction flaws””the important-affairs-of-life analogy, the alternative-hypothesis test, the unreasonable-doubts warning, and the search-for-the-truth mandate””and then explains, both logically and empirically, how each one violates our due process rights.Īfter discussing the reasonable-doubt standard and common jury-instruction flaws in Parts I and II, Part III discusses my attempt to win a very modest reform of Wisconsin’s jury instruction””a disastrous piece of work that incorporates all four of these burden-lowering defects. And many courts describe it in ways that lower, and sometimes even shift, the burden of proof. However, this high burden is only as formidable as the words used to describe it to the jury. The Constitution protects us from criminal conviction unless the government can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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